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Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement
JOHANNES CHAN
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
ABSTRACT Since late September 2014, thousands of protesters have occupied the main thor-
oughfares of Hong Kong and pressed demands for, inter alia, a genuine election of the Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017. The police initially
responded with tear gas, to which the protesters defended themselves with umbrellas, hence giv-
ing the movement its popular name. The occupation has lasted for more than a month since then,
and there is still no sign of resolution. This article will analyse the causes of this movement and
offer some thoughts on its implications for Hong Kong and China.
KEY WORDS: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, decolonization, Sino-British
Joint Declaration, functional constituencies, geographic constituencies, Basic Law, Occupy Central
movement, Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
Introduction
The campaign for democracy in Hong Kong has a long history. It can be traced back to
the abortive political reform undertaken in the colonial era by Governor Mark Young in
the 1950s. Whereas Britain has adopted a fairly standard package of democratic reform
for most of her colonies in the process leading to decolonization, no major constitu-
tional reform was introduced in Hong Kong after the war and any attempt to do so was
abandoned owing to strong opposition both from the business sector in Hong Kong and
from Beijing.1
The push for democracy regained momentum in the early 1980s and sparked into a
fully ﬂedged movement soon after the ratiﬁcation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration
under which Hong Kong was to be returned to China and would become a Special
Administrative Region on 1 July 1997. Since the mid-1980s, the pace and scale of the
democratic movement has consistently been on the political agenda in Hong Kong.
Between 1985 and 1987, there were strong public demands for the introduction of
direct election to the Legislative Council (LegCo). The earliest possible occasion was
1988, but the call for direct elections was rejected by the then British government in
1987, allegedly because of strong opposition from China, on the grounds that the Basic
Law was still in the process of being drafted, and that any democracy in Hong Kong
should be given by the Chinese, not by the British.
The public then turned its mind to the next legislative elections in 1991. As a result
of the 1989 suppression of student movement at Tiananmen in Beijing, the Hong Kong
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government, probably with the tacit agreement of China, agreed to introduce direct
elections for 18 out of 60 seats in LegCo in 1991. This was the ﬁrst time direct
elections to the LegCo had been introduced in Hong Kong, albeit for less than one-third
of its members.
Since then, the directly elected component has increased, but today still only 50% of
the members of LegCo are returned by direct election from geographic constituencies.
The remaining members come from ‘functional constituencies’, which comprise a very
small number of voters and represent mainly large business sectors.
Broadly speaking, the political spectrum in Hong Kong can be divided into two
major camps: the pro-establishment camp and the pan-democrats. For most of the geo-
graphic elections, the pan-democrats have until recently consistently secured about 60%
of the popular vote. Yet owing to the composition of the LegCo, they represent less
than 30% of the votes in the legislature. Pro-establishment candidates consistently win
the majority of the seats returned by ‘functional constituencies’. The split vote system,
under which any bills or amendments or motion debates sponsored by individual mem-
bers can only be passed by a majority of each of the two constituencies in the LegCo
as opposed to a simple majority of the whole house for government-sponsored bills,
further diminishes the inﬂuence of the popularly elected members.
While there have been some democratic reforms to the process for selecting the legis-
lature over the years, the same had not been true for the powerful head of Hong Kong’s
government. Before 1997, the Governor of Hong Kong was always appointed by
London. After Hong Kong’s return to China in 1997, the Chief Executive (CE) was to
be selected by a small group, the Election Committee, which increased its size from
400 for the ﬁrst term to 1,200 for the third term. The Election Committee is comprised
largely of representatives of different functional groups—essentially the functional
constituencies for LegCo elections—with a relatively small number of constituents and
a strong bias in favour of the business and pro-China factions.
Thus, Hong Kong has a strange political system. Those who are in power have no
popular mandate, and those who have a popular mandate have no power. Not surpris-
ingly, democracy and accountability have continued to dominate the political agenda
well after the changeover to Chinese rule.
Promises in the Basic Law
The Basic Law, which was promulgated in 1990, provides that the ultimate aim is to
have a fully elected LegCo and a CE returned by universal suffrage. It then sets out the
composition and the selection process for the ﬁrst three terms of the LegCo and the CE
after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 1997, and
further provides that the method of formation/selection could be changed after the third
term if there is a need to change. It is for the central government in Beijing to deter-
mine whether there is such a need. Thus, the earliest possible time for any change
under the Basic Law was in the third term, that is, around 2005.
Although there were continuous campaigns to bring forward the realization of the
ultimate goal of having full direct elections for both the LegCo and the CE in the
2000s, the central government has repeatedly decided that there is no need to change
the method of selection of the LegCo and CE. This has become a thorny issue every
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time there is an election. Hopes for relatively quick progress to fully democratic
elections have been disappointed. Small progress has, however, been made.
In December 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
(NPCSC) ruled out direct elections for 2012, but it also unexpectedly stated in its deci-
sion that there might be direct election of the CE in 2017 and thereafter for the LegCo,
which means 2020 at the earliest. To many people this was a great disappointment, as
there would be no full direct election until 20 years after the changeover. Nonetheless,
for the ﬁrst time there was a timetable.
In 2012, C. Y. Leung, who was the second choice of Beijing, surprisingly won the
election after scandal damaged Beijing’s initially preferred candidate. Leung won with a
bare majority of 689 votes from the 1,200 member Election Committee. His small
mandate once again highlighted the unsatisfactory nature of the Election Committee.
The 2017 Election of the Chief Executive
Since 2012, the focus of the community has been on the 2017 election of the CE. The
main issue is the nomination process, as under Art. 45 of the Basic Law, the CE ‘shall
be elected by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nomina-
tion committee in accordance with a democratic process’. The main questions are: What
is a broadly representative nomination committee? What constitutes a democratic
process? Can nominations be made other than by the nomination committee?
These issues turned out to be highly charged. The Hong Kong community has
become highly divided and polarized, especially during the months preceding the
NPCSC’s 31 August 2014 decision concerning the process for nominating CE candi-
dates. At one end of the spectrum, the conservatives wanted to keep the Election Com-
mittee from the previous CE election cycles as the nomination committee for the 2017
election and even raise the threshold for nomination (which had been well below half
of the committee in previous cycles). At the other end of the spectrum, many people
have no conﬁdence in the Election Committee model. So they advocated civic nomina-
tion, that is, a person who has secured a certain amount of popular endorsement from
the voters becoming a candidate. Another proposal was to have nomination by political
parties that will have secured a certain percentage of votes in the LegCo election in
2016.
The Hong Kong government began a consultation process in December 2013, which
was concluded in May 2014. During the consultation period, the central government in
Beijing made it clear that the CE has to be ‘patriotic’, that the nomination has to be
made by the nomination committee and not any other body (thereby excluding civic
nomination), and that the nomination committee’s composition should be modelled on
the Election Committee, notably keeping the Election Committee’s structure of four
equally represented sectors (industrial, commercial and ﬁnancial, the professions, labour,
social services, religious and other, and current and former political ofﬁceholders) that
generally track the functional constituencies for LegCo.
Although the composition of the Election Committee appears at face value to be
broadly representative, this is far from the case. Apart from the 39 members of the Leg-
Co who are returned by universal suffrage, the remaining members of the Election
Committee are returned by a small number of voters. The number of voters in each
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subsector is on average about 1,000, making the total number of voters less than
240,000. Many of the subsectors comprise only corporate voters, or a majority of cor-
porate voters, and the criteria to become a voter are very unclear. Thus, for example,
the ﬁsheries and agricultural subsector returns a total of 60 members to the Election
Committee. The subsector comprises about 83 voters, all of whom are organizations.
Many may look to have the same or very similar memberships, such as the Aberdeen
Fisherman Friendship Association, Aberdeen Fisherwomen Association, Hong Kong
Fishermen’s Association and Hong Kong and Kowloon Fishermen Association Ltd.
There is no clear procedure of how an organization becomes a voter. Thus, it comes as
no surprise that there is no conﬁdence that this body would be representative and would
make a nomination that could represent the general view of the public. The contrived
membership also means that it could easily be manipulated.
Although not everyone supports the proposal of civic nomination, it is fair to say that
there is a fair amount of consensus in the Hong Kong community that political screen-
ing at the nomination stage is unacceptable. Civic nomination was initially perceived to
be a negotiation tactic. However, as time passed, it has become a principle in itself. It
is also a commonly held view that if there were no genuine election in 2017, Hong
Kong would become ungovernable given the level of public expectation for a genuine
election.
Thus, during the consultation process, there were the moderates who accepted the
principle that there should not be unreasonable restrictions on nomination, but consid-
ered that this could be achieved within the parameters set by the central government in
Beijing without recourse to civic nomination or political party nomination. Many also
recognized that the way forward has to be to forge some consensus between the moder-
ate faction of the pan-democrats and the liberal faction of the pro-establishment group.
By the end of the consultation period in May 2014, there were no fewer than 10 differ-
ent proposals that could broadly be described as falling within this moderate middle
ground.
The Occupy Central Movement
At the same time, at around the end of the year 2012, Law Professor Benny Tai of the
University of Hong Kong, along with two others, started the Occupy Central move-
ment. They were worried that the eventual model for selecting CE nominees would be
a conservative model with political screening, and they wanted a model without unrea-
sonable restrictions to be in place for 2017. Benny Tai and others of his generation
started campaigning for democracy in Hong Kong when they were young university
students. He is now in his mid-50s and is still campaigning for democracy. To some
extent, he represents a group that sees itself as having waited for long enough. Their
patience is running out.
Occupy Central—with ‘Central’ being the name for the area in Hong Kong that is at
the heart of the ﬁnancial district and adjacent to key government ofﬁces—was intended
to be a movement of civil disobedience. Tai and other Occupy Central leaders have
advocated for a peaceful movement. ‘Occupy’ is also intended to be the last resort. Fol-
lowing Tai’s plan, there were to be ﬁve rounds of civil discourse on various political
models, and at the end the participants would make an informed choice of one of the
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models proposed by the community. They would then adopt that model as a benchmark
to measure against the model that the Hong Kong government eventually proposed, and
would conduct a popular poll (or referendum) to decide whether the government’s pro-
posal was acceptable. If not, and if Tai’s group had the popular mandate to go ahead,
then, and only then, would they move to Occupy Central, as a last resort.
In light of its destructive nature, Occupy Central is controversial in Hong Kong, even
among the pan-democrats. Yet it did open up a window for the moderates to seek a
middle ground. Unfortunately, things did not turn out as planned. In June 2014, after
the completion of the consultation process by the Hong Kong government, Benny Tai
decided to put the 15 models that had been proposed to a vote among those who had
participated in the previous rounds of ‘civil discourse’, with a view to selecting three
models for popular vote. Unfortunately, all three models that were chosen included an
element of ‘civic nomination’, thus leaving the public who wanted to participate in the
unofﬁcial balloting with no choice but to vote in favour of civic nomination (or not to
vote at all). The process was subject to widespread criticisms from left, right and cen-
tre, charging that the process that limited the public to a choice among three similar
models itself was an example of the ‘political screening’ that Tai and others had con-
demned as a ﬂaw of any nomination process that did not allow for civic nomination.
Support for Occupy Central was at its lowest at that time.
A Turning Point: The Central Government’s White Paper
The central government then published a White Paper on Hong Kong.2 Unlike Beijing’s
previous stance, the tone of the White Paper is very much that the current extent of
autonomy is the extent that the central government is prepared to tolerate. The White
Paper also includes a controversial part stating that judges, being part of the administra-
tion, have to be patriotic. To be fair, there is nothing of substance that is new in the
White Paper. But the concern in Hong Kong is not the content but the way the message
was conveyed.
The White Paper sparked widespread criticisms and worries in Hong Kong, espe-
cially because it touches upon basic values such as the rule of law and the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. This has resurrected popular support for Occupy Central. In late
June, when Occupy Central put forward the three chosen proposals for popular voting,
about 800,000 people turned out to vote. This turnout was all the more impressive
because it occurred despite various attempts to jam the computers through which partic-
ipants voted in the online poll, and political threats about the consequences for Hong
Kong of even an unofﬁcial referendum calling for political change that Beijing would
not accept. The unexpectedly large turnout gave a new push to and strong legitimacy
for the claim for civic nomination, thanks to the central government.
The NPCSC Decision
The CE submitted his report on the Hong Kong government’s consultation process to
the NPCSC in July 2014. At the end of August, the NPCSC decided that the composi-
tion, the number of members and the method of formation of the nomination committee
for 2017 will be the same as (and not just designed with reference to) the Election
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Committee in 2012, and each candidate will need the endorsement of over 50% of the
members of the nomination committee, which is much higher than the 12.5% that was
adopted for nomination in the previous Election Committee.
This NPCSC decision is more conservative than the community had expected. Not
only does it exclude any possibility that a candidate favoured by the pan-democrats will
be successfully nominated, it also leaves little room for the middle ground options that
had been discussed in Hong Kong during 2013 and earlier in 2014. The NPCSC deci-
sion leaves the pan-democrats with limited choices: either use their representation in
LegCo to vote down the electoral legislation that the Hong Kong government would
introduce to implement the NPCSC decision (something the pan-democrats could do if
they stuck together because the legislation will need a two-thirds majority in LegCo to
pass the proposal for constitutional reform), or take the issue to the streets.
The Hong Kong government’s plan apparently was to make use of the time before
the proposal is to be voted on by the LegCo to divide the pan-democrats. All that the
government would need is about ﬁve defections among the pan-democrat legislators to
secure the requisite two-thirds majority.
The Occupation
Following the NPCSC decision, dissatisfaction continued to build up in Hong Kong. In
late September, students started a boycott of classes. They started to demonstrate out-
side the government headquarters at Queensway, and as the demonstration gathered
momentum and support, they asked where the Occupy Central people were. By the end
of the ﬁrst week of the boycott, at the end of September, Benny Tai and his group had
no choice but to announce bringing forward the date of Occupy Central to join the stu-
dent protestors.
When ‘Occupy’ started, the police tried to contain the initial group of demonstrators
and to stop other people from joining, but this led to even more people coming to sur-
round the police. Very soon the protestors spread to occupy the main roads. When
police started using tear gas, somewhat indiscriminately, against the protestors, this
brought even more people to support the students, and the protestors’ use of umbrellas
to deﬂect pepper spray gave the movement its popular name. Very soon, instead of
occupying just Central, people started occupying the shopping districts at Causeway
Bay and Mongkok, and some called the movement Occupy Hong Kong. It soon
became clear that no one person or organization is or could be in control of the move-
ment any longer.
The students, who are at the forefront of the movement, want NPCSC to withdraw
its August decision, to restart the consultation process and to allow civic nomination.
After the use of tear gas by the police, they also called for the resignation of the CE. In
reply, the government took a ﬁrm stance that the electoral process has to comply with
the Basic Law, meaning no civic nomination. At the same time, the police adopted a
more conciliatory attitude and did not make any serious attempts to clear the protestors
from the occupied areas.
As the occupation entered its second and third weeks, the blockage of the main roads
caused considerable inconvenience to the public, and there was an increasing sense of
dissatisfaction among the public who were affected. Some resorted to self-help and
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ended up in confrontations with the protestors. There was also the so-called
Anti-Occupy Central group, which was formed earlier in the year to countenance the
Occupy Central group, and which was believed to be heavily ﬁnanced by the central
government. There were various violent confrontations between the protestors and the
Anti-Occupy Central group, and the government was accused of not attempting to stop
the violent behaviour of the Anti-Occupy Central group or their supporters. The govern-
ment at ﬁrst agreed to hold talks with the students on 13 October 2014, but it unilater-
ally cancelled the talks at the last minute.
As public dissatisfaction of the inconvenience caused by the occupation of major
thoroughfares continued to grow, the police successfully removed the barricades without
meeting serious resistance. Yet the protestors very soon returned to the occupied areas.
On 21 October, the government ﬁnally met with the students, who made four
demands: (1) withdrawal of the NPCSC decision in August 2014; (2) endorsing civic
nomination for the election of the CE; (3) abolition of functional constituencies; and (4)
a clear timetable to achieve these objectives. There was no longer a call for the resigna-
tion of the CE, though the demand for abolition of functional constituencies had been
added (although this has been a long-standing issue in the democratic reform of the
LegCo). In response, the government offered to submit a report to the central govern-
ment setting out in an impartial manner the public sentiment that was expressed after
the NPCSC decision in August 2014, and undertook to maximize the scope of represen-
tation in the nomination committee in a further round of consultation. It also offered to
continue the dialogue and assured the protestors that the government would continue to
work towards further constitutional reform after 2017. The government responses were
rejected by the students as being too vague and non-committing, and they decided to
stay in the occupied areas.
At the same time, some pro-China groups successfully obtained an injunction order
from the High Court compelling the protesters to clear the occupied areas. The protest-
ers refused to comply with the injunction order, and were criticized for endangering the
rule of law. The government has not taken any action to enforce the injunction, at least
not until the court has authorized the police to enforce the civil injunction. At the end
of October, Benny Tai decided to return to university to resume his teaching, whereas
the students planned to petition the central government during the Asia-Paciﬁc Eco-
nomic Pact meeting in November. Some members of the pan-democrats also proposed
to urge a few elected members of the LegCo to resign and try to get elected again on a
single issue platform of nomination as a form of referendum, a controversial move that
they adopted a few years ago.
At the Crossroads
Since the third week of the occupation, there has been a bit of a stalemate and growing
fatigue among both the protestors and the wider community. It is difﬁcult to sustain a
movement by continuous blockage of main roads, as the inconvenience to the public
means that the movement loses popular support. The protesters’ refusal to comply with
the injunction order of the court has also attracted criticism from those who sympathize
with them, as it is considered to be a blatant denial of the rule of law. The protesters
demand civic nomination, which the central government will not accept and which the
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Hong Kong government has no power to agree. On the other hand, it is difﬁcult for the
students just to retreat empty-handed, and repeated calls for their retreat are likely to be
futile. Unless the protesters are willing to back down from their demands or they are
offered at least something so that they are able to ﬁnd an opportune excuse to retreat, it
is likely that they will continue to stay in the occupied areas.
On the part of the Hong Kong government, its hands are tied. Political reform is basi-
cally decided by the central government. The occupation has caused considerable incon-
venience to the community and has begun to have an impact on the economy. The
government’s choice has been either to use force to clear the site at some point, or to talk
out the protestors. Yet any attempt to use force to disperse the protestors would incite
more public support for the movement. It is clear that the government could not accede
to the demands of the students/protesters, and its tactic was to let the protest drag on so
as to wear out the protesters, especially when public dissatisfaction was growing. The
government could have played a more active role as a mediator between the students/pro-
testers and the central government, but it seems to be hesitant to take up such a role.
Beijing has condemned the movement. It has not helped that the movement has
sometimes been called the ‘Umbrella Revolution’. ‘Revolution’ touches a nerve in
Beijing, where wariness of the ‘colour revolutions’ elsewhere remains strong. Beijing
has accused foreign powers, notably the United States, of being behind the movement.
Since mid-June, Beijing has raised the level of concern about the unrest in Hong Kong
to one of ‘national security’. Thus, for Beijing, Occupy in Hong Kong is not about
democracy but national security, although suppression of the movement by the People’s
Liberation Army is apparently not on the agenda of Beijing’s leaders, as, ﬁrst, this is
unnecessary because any forceful suppression could be done by the police in Hong
Kong, and, second, such a move would create more problems than it could solve.
Conclusion
How will the movement unfold? Even if the students were prepared to retreat, the root
causes leading to the occupation would not be resolved. On the face of it, the immedi-
ate triggering factor is the NPCSC decision in August to impose a restrictive nomina-
tion regime. Deep down, for some of the protesters, there is frustration that they have
been campaigning for democracy for over 30 years and they are not prepared to wait
any longer. For some, they want to be in greater control of their lives at a time when
things seem desperate for them, especially their economic prospects. Property prices
have gone up, the gap between the rich and the poor keeps widening, and the prospects
for high-paying employment have dimmed, leaving many young people with little hope
for their future. For some, it is frustration with the incompetence of the government
generally or with the CE himself, who has been plagued with scandal after scandal
(including a recently exposed, previously secret multi-million-dollar payment from an
Australian company before he became CE) and a political tin ear (including a recent
interview in which he opposed full democracy in Hong Kong because it would give the
vote to poorer people who demand more generous social welfare policies). These issues
have to be addressed.
Despite the discontent in Hong Kong, Beijing is unlikely to change its decision. Its
concern is, rightly or wrongly, stability in Hong Kong and foreign interference in Hong
Kong. Stability is at the forefront of the minds of the Chinese leadership. At a deeper
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level, the issue of democracy in Hong Kong goes to what Beijing understands to be the
meaning of the promised ‘high degree of autonomy’ for Hong Kong. The Joint Declara-
tion is, for Beijing, a unilateral announcement of its policies towards Hong Kong, not
an agreement, as such, with Britain. Therefore, any foreign comments or interference
with Hong Kong’s affairs is an interference with China’s domestic affairs. Beijing’s
approach to the Basic Law is both historical (it has given more than what the British
had given when they ruled Hong Kong) and political (the Basic Law has to be con-
strued and understood in a way to serve the wider political ends of maintaining stability
and prosperity). Liberal democracy as understood in the western sense was never part
of the promise in Beijing’s view. Democracy is tolerated only to the extent that it is
necessary to sustain prosperity and stability in Hong Kong. Beijing’s understanding of
autonomy is that Beijing will not send its own cadres to rule Hong Kong, but Hong
Kong has to be run by someone from Hong Kong whom Beijing trusts. This is the
price for Beijing’s granting Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy. Election has to be
a process in which Beijing will know the outcome before the ballots are cast. Unfortu-
nately, this is a contradiction in terms, and it has meant a sharp divergence in the under-
standing of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law between the central government
and the people in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong government’s hands are tied, but it does not mean that there is noth-
ing the government can do. Yet it has so far shown a singular lack of leadership or moral
courage. It has been suspected that the central government does not have a full picture of
the sentiment in Hong Kong, and its repeated statements of foreign interference and
Hong Kong trying to gain independence are entirely out of touch with the reality in Hong
Kong. Thus, the government’s offer to submit a report to the central government setting
out fully and impartially the public sentiment since August 2014 is a positive step, albeit
a step too little too late. Although Beijing is unlikely to change the framework of its
August decision, could modiﬁcations of some part of its decision, such as lowering the
threshold from the proposed 50% to the previous 12.5%, coupled with other promises to
widen the representation of the nomination committee, be a way out? At the very least,
could a meeting be arranged between leaders of the central government and the students
as a means to provide students with an excuse to retreat from the occupied area? How-
ever, these could be achieved only if the Hong Kong government, and those who have
the ears of Beijing, are prepared to persuade the Beijing leaders, and this is not forthcom-
ing. Further dialogue with the protesters is essential, but unless both sides are prepared to
work harder and to compromise, such dialogues are unlikely to lead to any fruitful result.
Thus, we are now in a deadlock and at a crossroads. Chinese propaganda has
described the movement as a ‘riot’,3 the same term that it used to describe the Tianan-
men event in 1989 in April that year. Would there be a peaceful solution, or would it
end up as another bloody and violent page in history? Only history can tell, but at this
stage, there is little cause for optimism.
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